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THE SYNTACTIC DISTRIBUTION OF FACTIVE COMPLEMENTS 1
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes Kiparsky & Kiparsky’s (1970) observation that there
exists a deep correlation between the semantics and the syntax of factive
complements in the light of a wide range of (old and new) phenomena : the
incompatibility of ECM and that-less complements with factive predicates,
weak island effects, the incompatibility of pure propositional complements
with verbs that contain aspectual prefixes (RE-, DIS-), restricted sequences of
tenses in propositional contexts. I then propose a structural difference between
propositional and factive complements with respect to the syntactic position
they occupy that accounts for the syntactic phenomena discussed here, while
providing a solid basis to capture the semantic difference with regard to the
presupposition associated with each complement type : factive complements
are argued to appear outside the VP at LF, while propositional complements
must occupy their base-generated position within VP.
KEYWORDS
Factive, presupposition, proposition, complementizer selection, null
complementizer, -affixation, syntax-semantics interface, Tense-predicate
interactions, sequences of Tenses.
1. Introduction
Kiparsky & Kiparsky’s (1970) seminal work on factive predicates
shows the existence of a deep correlation between the semantic properties of
factive complements, in particular the presuppositional force associated with
these complements, and their syntactic behavior with regard to a wide range
of phenomena. Before and after Kiparsky & Kiparsky’s paper [henceforth
K&K], there have been numerous proposals and studies concerning factivity
and presupposition, which approach the issue from very different theoretical
perspectives. However, most of these studies focus on a very different side of
the issue and mainly pay attention to the properties of presupposition from a
semantic or a pragmatic perspective ; in general, these analyses do not try to
account for the syntax/semantics correlation that was central in K&K’s paper
in the first place, and generally ignore the question of the syntax of these
constructions altogether 2.
In this paper, I reconsider the syntax/semantic correlation discussed by
K&K, extending the evidence to new properties where the parallelism they
propose shows up even in a more systematic way. I then explore a possible
way to derive all these phenomena from a deeper property of the predicates
involved. In particular, I propose a structural difference between propositional
and factive complements with respect to the syntactic position they occupy. In
a nutshell, factive complements are argued to appear outside the VP at LF,
while pure propositional complements must occupy their base-generated
position within VP at LF. As I argue in section 4, this structural difference
accounts for all the syntactic phenomena discussed here ; at the same time, the
analysis provides a solid structural basis to capture the semantic difference
with regard to the presuppositional force associated with each complement type.
2. Syntactic differences between factive and propositional
complements
2.1. Exceptional Case Marking
It is a property of factive predicates, known at least since K&K, that
they do not take ECM complements, while accepting gerunds.
(1) a. *He regrets [Bacon to be the real author].
b. They reported/remember [the enemy’s having suffered a decisive defeat].
Contra K&K’s observation, Pesetsky (1992) associates the ability of
predicates to allow ECM-complements to the lack of agentivity on the part of
their subject, and he proposes that the relevant factor that determines whether
a given predicate is able to assign accusative Case to the embedded subject or
not is inversely related to its ability to assign an agent Q-role to its external
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argument. The behavior of verbs like remember or assume seems to support
this correlation ; Pesetsky notes that these verbs allow ECM-complements in
general, but this option becomes progressively less acceptable as the
agentivity of the subject increases :
(2) a. Sue assumed God to exist during the writing of her theology dissertation.
b. ??Sue was careful to assume God to exist during the writing of her
theology dissertation.
However, several properties of the predicates involved suggest that K&K’s
original observation is on the right track, and that the relevant factor is not the
degree of agentivity of the subject, but rather whether the clausal complement
is interpreted as presupposed (and consequently the predicate is factive) or
instead it is a pure propositional one. For instance, remember, which Pesetsky
uses to support his claim, is semantically ambiguous between a propositional
and a factive interpretation ; as the continuation in (3a-b) shows (see Vendler
1967, Asher 1993, Ormazabal 1995), only when the clausal complement is
interpreted as purely propositional is ECM possible :
(3) a. Mary thinks that she vaguely remembers Bill to have misplaced the keys
in one occasion, but I doubt he ever did.
b. ?*Finally, Mary remembered Bill to have misplaced the keys in one
occasion, a fact that she couldn’t recall for years.
Independent evidence showing that the contrast in (3) is based on factivity
and not on the degree of agentivity comes from the parallel behavior of tensed
that-less clauses. Compare, for instance Pesetsky’s original example in (2)
with the following examples :
(4) a. ?*Sue was careful to assume [God to exist] during the writing of her
theology dissertation.
b. ?*Sue was careful to assume [ØComp [God exists/existed]] during the
writing of her theology dissertation.
c. Sue was careful to assume [that [God exists/existed]] during the writing of
her theology dissertation.
The contrast in (4a-c) illustrates the fact that the distribution of that-less
clauses coincides with ECM-complements. But, unlike in ECM-contexts like
(4a), in the case of that-less clauses in (4b) there is no thematic or Case
relationship between the matrix predicate and the subject of the embedded
tensed clause which could be appealed to. Since Pesetsky´s agentivity
generalization cannot apply in this case, it plausibly does not in the ECM-
constructions either. On the other hand, the factive/propositional distinction
makes the right division in a unified way, as K&K originally proposed.
Moreover, the same paradigm reappears with causative predicates, and
even in contexts where the subject is not animate -and presumably non-
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agentive- (see Pesetsky 1992, Ormazabal 1995 for discussion) ; ECM and
that-less clauses are possible when a non-presuppositional interpretation is
possible, but only that-clauses may appear when the factive interpretation is
forced somehow:
(5) a. *This experiment convincingly shows/demonstrates [cold fusion to be
impossible], which we already knew
b. *This experiment definitely/convincingly shows/demonstrates [cold
fusion is impossible], which we already knew
c. This experiment convincingly shows/demonstrates [that cold fusion is
impossible], which we already knew
In conclusion, we may consider Pesetsky’s generalization as a subcase of the
more general observations in (6), due to K&K (1970: 160) :
(6) K&K’S GENERALIZATION : Factive Verbs are incompatible with ECM-
complements.
2.2. Complementizer deletion
What makes these paradigms particularly interesting is the fact that the
parallel between ECM-complements and that-deletion in tensed clauses is
general in factive contexts ; thus, non-ambiguously factive verbs do not allow
that-less complements either :
(7) a. Mary pointed out [*(that) [Sue wasn’t there]]
b. Mary believed/thought [(that) [Sue wasn’t there]].
Moreover, as we have seen, the parallelism also extends to ambiguous
predicates of the kind discussed in (4)-(5) above, where the that-less
alternative is impossible precisely in those contexts where ECM-infinitives
are, and even to causative verbs with non animate subjects of the type
discussed by Pesetsky. We can recast this observation in terms similar to
K&K’s generalization in (8) :
(8) FACTIVE-COMPLEMENTIZER GENERALIZATION : Factive predicates do not take
that-less tensed complements.
K&K propose an explanation for the impossibility of ECM-
complements, aimed to account for the syntactic/semantic correlation. They
postulate a fundamental difference in the internal structure they assign to
factive and nonfactive complements : factive predicates have in the
underlying representation an NP projection over the sentential complement
whose head is an abstract noun fact ; this projection prevents Case assignment
to the embedded subject.
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I will postpone the discussion of other aspects of K&K’s analysis until
the last section ; it is worth noting, however, that the impossibility of ECM-
infinitives and the restriction against that-less clauses in this analysis are not
completely related, a fact that considerably weakens the hypothesis. Instead,
Ormazabal (1995) extensively argues that ECM and that-less clauses have in
common that they are CPs headed by a null complementizer, an affix 3.
Consequently, (6) and (8) together with this observation, may be recast in
more general terms :
(9) FACTIVE-COMPLEMENTIZER GENERALIZATION : factive predicates do not
allow complements headed by a null complementizer.
Of course, that distributional restriction on factive contexts could be
stipulated as a selectional property of the factive predicates themselves. If the
lexical complementizer that and the null complementizer were distinguished
from one another and attributed different semantic roles, the semantic
compatibility of one of the complementizers with the selectional properties of
a given matrix predicate would not necessarily imply that the predicate must
also be semantically compatible with the other, because these two
complementizers would not be semantically equivalent. That is basically
Hegarty’s (1991) proposal, where the propositional complementizer is
semantically meaningless and is deleted before LF, while the factive that is
semantically contentful.
However, in my view both the null and the that-complementizer
contribute exactly the same to the common propositional interpretation of the
complement and whatever differences there are between that and the null
complementizer must derive from the morphological properties of the Ø-affix
and not from their syntactic or semantic function 4. Consequently, the
impossibility of Ø-complementizers in factive contexts must derive from their
morphological properties.
In Ormazabal (1995), I extensively argue that the distribution of Ø-
complementizers in a large variety of contexts is restricted by the fact that
they must incorporate, an extension of Stowell’s (1981) NULL
COMPLEMENTIZER GOVERNMENT requirement. If that is correct, the linkage
between the structural position factive and pure propositional complements
occupy and the distribution of null complementizers is immediate.
Observe that the system works in the opposite direction to what is
generally assumed : the standard that-deletion approach to this problem
assumes that the factive complementizer that, unlike the propositional one,
contributes to the semantic content of the sentence and, consequently, it must
be present at LF and cannot be erased. The approach pursued here attributes
the same semantic role to the complementizer in both contexts. The
impossibility of ØComp in the head of factive CPs derives from the
THE SYNTACTIC DISTRIBUTION OF FACTIVE COMPLEMENTS 95
morphological properties of this complementizer, which force it to
incorporate ; the overt complementizer that is thus the only syntactic option,
not because of its particular semantic role, but because it is the only
complementizer compatible with the factive interpretation that is not required
to incorporate.
2.3. Island Effects
An additional, well known, property of factive contexts is that the
complements of these predicates are weak islands (see Rizzi 1990 ; see also
K&K’s analysis based on the Complex NP Constraint and Melvold 1991).
Compare the sentences in (10) and (11) :
(10) ¿Por qué piensas [que vinieron tan tarde]?
why think (you) that came-they so late
‘Why do you think they came that late?’
(11) ¿Por qué descubriste [que vinieron tan tarde]?
why discover (you) that came-they so late
‘Why did you discover that they came that late ?’
In (10), the matrix question is ambiguous and the interrogative element why
may be interpreted either as belonging to the matrix predicate – «Why do you
think so?» – or to the embedded non-factive complement – « In your opinion,
why did they come that late ?» –. Instead, the matrix question in (11), with a
factive predicate, only has one interpretation, the one corresponding to the
wh-phrase connected to the matrix clause – «Why did you discover so?» –,
and the embedded reading is impossible ; that is, the sentence in (11) cannot
be interpreted as «According to your discoveries, why did they come so
late?». Although neutral between an analysis, à la K&K, which postulates
that the difference between factive and non-factive complements is in their
internal structure and an alternative that considers it to follow from a
difference in the structural position these complements occupy with respect to
the matrix predicate, the contrast in (10)-(11), together with the previous
arguments, strongly supports a structural approach to the problem.
2.4. Keyser’s test
Following a suggestion by Keyser (personal communication),
Ormazabal (1995, ch. 2) discusses the particular distribution of clausal
complements when combined with matrix predicates that contain an aspectual
prefix such as re- or dis-, a phenomenon also sensitive to the type of
complement clauses. These verbs have the particularity that, under certain
circumstances, the range of possible complements they take is highly more
restricted than the ones their unprefixed counterparts do.
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The phenomenon distinguishes two groups : on the one hand, non-
factive propositional complements of all kinds -in particular that-clauses,
that-less clauses and ECM-infinitives- are incompatible with verbs containing
an aspectual prefix of this type, even if these complements are allowed with
the unprefixed version of the predicate :
(12) a. They (*re-)considered [(that) Jane was intelligent]
b. They (*re-)considered [Jane to be intelligent]
(13) a. They (*dis)believe [(that) Jane was heading the group]
b. They (*dis)believe [Jane to have been heading the group]
On the other hand, factive complements of all kinds (that-clauses, gerund
constructions, derived nominals), event-denoting nominals and control
infinitives may combine with prefixed verbs ; leaving aside the last cases (see
Ormazabal 1995, sect. 2.4.4 and 4.5 for discussion), the examples in (14)
illustrate the different factive complements :
(14) a. They rediscovered [CP that [Jane was leading the expedition]]
b. They rediscovered having left the group.
c. We (dis)approve [the invasion of Irak]
An important property that distinguishes the phenomena previously discussed
from this and the next phenomena is that while the former are cases where the
factive context is more restricted than the propositional one, in the case of
prefixed verbs in this section and the sequences of Tenses discussed next, the
pure propositional contexts are more restricted than the factive ones.
3. Factive/Propositional Predicates and Tense Relations
3.1. Sequences of Tenses
Consider now the contrast in (15) :
(15) a. * Mary believed/considered/thought [that John will arrive/we’ll go hiking
tomorrow]
b. Mary pointed out/forgot/remembered [that John will arrive/we’ll go hiking
tomorrow]
[Uribe-Etxebarria 1994 ; Ormazabal & Uribe-Etxebarria 1996]
In contexts like (15), when the predicate is non-factive – as in (15a) – certain
sequences of tenses between the matrix and the embedded clauses are not
allowed.
(16) FACTIVE-TENSE GENERALIZATION (weak version) :
a)When in factive contexts, future tense in the embedded sentence is possible.
b) Pure propositional predicates in the past tense do not allow a
complement in the future tense.
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Contrary to what could be thought by looking at (15a), it is not the case
that there is an intrinsic incompatibility in the occurrence of propositional
predicates like think and a future tense in their complement, as Uribe-
Etxebarria (1994) observes ; (17) shows that the future Tense may appear in
the complement of think, provided that it is in the right syntactic context. Nor
is there a semantic incompatibility between propositional predicates and a
future interpretation of the embedded clause : when would appears under a
past Tense, it may be interpreted as future with regard to both the matrix and
the utterance time.
(17) a. Mary thinks/believes [that John will arrive tomorrow]
b. Mary thought that Sue would defend her thesis tomorrow.
Thus, it may be easily shown that the problem is due to the sequence of tenses.
In a first approximation, it seems that will may not appear in a propositional
complement when a [+PAST] Tense appears in the matrix clause. Given that,
an interesting question arises as to why the sentential complement of factive
predicates may have a will form when the matrix tense is [+Past], as in (15b).
A structural hypothesis along the lines of Stowell (1993) and especially
Uribe-Etxebarria (1994) and Ormazabal & Uribe-Etxebarria (1996) may
account for these restrictions in the possible sequences of Tenses in a natural
way, if the assumption concerning the position of propositional and factive
complements proposed in this article is correct ; but in order to show that this
is so, a short digression is necessary to present some of the properties of the
constructions at stake in more detail.
3.2. A short digression : Tense and Negative Polarity Items
Within the context of her LF theory of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs)
and in a discussion about Tense/NPI interactions, Uribe-Etxebarria (1994)
observes the following paradigm:
(18) a. Mary didn’t say [that Ann would read any books tomorrow].
b. Mary didn’t say [that Ann had read any books last year].
c. *Mary didn’t say [that Ann will read any books this fall].
[Uribe-Etxebarria 1994, ch. 3, ex. (17)]
As she observes, the ungrammaticality of (18c) is due to the unappropriate
combination created by the negative polarity item any in the embedded clause
and the wrong sequence of tenses – i.e., the future tense will of the
complement clause embedded under a [+Past] Tense.
That the negative polarity item may appear within a clausal
complement in future Tense may be seen in (19), also from Uribe-Etxebarria :
(19) Mary will not believe/say [that Ann will read any books this fall] [ibid ex.
(18)]
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On the other hand, contrary to the case of think discussed above, the form will
may appear in the embedded clause even when the matrix clause has a past
tense, as far as we replace the negative polarity item with a « regular» definite
NP, provided the matrix verb is say, rather than believe. This is illustrated by
the contrast in (20) :
(20) a. *Mary didn’t say [that Ann will read any books this fall].
b. Mary didn’t say [that Ann will read those books this fall].
To account for the ungrammaticality of cases like (20a), Uribe-Etxebarria
shows that there is a basic incompatibility between the syntactic conditions
licensing the negative polarity item and the morphological requirements
imposed on the Tense form will, both of them independently well-motivated.
On the one hand, the negative polarity item any must be bound by a “close”
negative element, a well-known property of these elements that has been
discussed elsewhere in the literature. On the other hand, the distribution of
will and would is driven by the different morphological requirements imposed
on these two future forms ; simplifying things a bit, we may assume that, as a
consequence of its morphological conditions, will cannot remain within the
scope of a past tense (see Ogihara 1995, Uribe-Etxebarria 1994, and
references there). As a consequence of this requirement, when the embedded
clause has a tense morphologically realized as will and the matrix Tense is
specified as [+Past], will must move out of the c-command domain of the
matrix Tense at LF, pied-piping the entire complement clause with it. Details
aside, this is represented in (21) :
(21) TP
T VP
[+Past]
V [CP… will…]
However, it is precisely this movement that makes NPIs incompatible with
will in contexts like (20a). If this movement operation takes place, when the
clausal complement escapes from the c-command domain of the matrix Tense
it also moves to a position structurally higher than the negative head attached
to it, and the negative polarity item inside is not in a position c-commanded
by Neg any longer. If, instead, the sentential complement stays in situ, the NPI
is c-commanded by the negative element ; that is precisely what happens
when the embedded future Tense is morphologically realized as would. In the
case of will, however, the derivation will not converge, because the
morphological requirement of this head, which requires it to be outside the
scope of the [+Past] Tense, will not be satisfied when the complement stays
in its base-generated position.
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3.3. Tense and the Structural Position of Factive Complements
Keeping this discussion in mind, let us go back to the difference
between pure propositional and factive predicates with respect to the [+Past]-
will sequence presented at the beginning of this section :
(22) a. *Mary believed/considered/thought that Sue will defend her thesis
tomorrow.
b. Mary pointed out/forgot/remembered that Sue will defend her thesis
tomorrow. [= (15)]
As observed earlier, the ungrammaticality of the propositional cases in (22a)
is due to the sequence of tenses ; in particular, only when will appears under a
past tense are these constructions ungrammatical. In that respect, these cases
may be subsumed under the NPI constructions discussed by Uribe-Etxebarria
(1994) and presented in the previous section ; compare the sentence in (22a)
with that of (20a), also ungrammatical, where the negative polarity item and
the future form will coappear under the matrix past tense.
However, notice that in the NPI cases in (20) there is an independent
reason, the requirement that the negative polarity item be c-commanded by
the negative element not, that generated the conflict with the future form will.
When the NPI is not present, the morphological condition imposed on will is
syntactically “active” and strong enough to override the effects of the Last
Resort Condition on movement, and the complement moves out of the scope
of [+Past] Tense, as the grammatical result in (23) (= (20b)) shows.
(23) Mary didn’t say [that Ann will read those books this fall].
If the explanation proposed for (20) is expected to extend to the
propositional cases in (22a), there must be an independent condition, parallel
to the c-command requirement imposed on the NPI, that forces the sentence
to be in the VP-internal position also in this case, conflicting with the
morphological requirement on will. Otherwise, the clausal complement,
driven by this condition, would be able to move out of the scope of [+Past]
Tense and the sentence would be incorrectly predicted to be grammatical.
Given the absence of other independent motivation and, especially,
given the contrast between factive and propositional contexts illustrated in
(22), a structural difference on the lines of the hypothesis defended in this
paper appears to be a strong candidate. If, as proposed, the complement of
pure propositional predicates must be in a VP-internal position at LF, it is
precisely this requirement that conflicts with the morphological properties of
will, which must be outside the c-command domain of the [+Past] Tense –
hence, outside VP –, and consequently it is responsible for the
ungrammaticality of the constructions under discussion.
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An independent difference between the predicate Uribe-Etxebarria
chooses to argue her case and the propositional predicates discussed in this
section also supports the same conclusion ; consider, for instance, the
following examples, where no independent morphological requirement is
imposed on the embedded Tense :
(24) a. Mary didn’t say that Sue was defending her thesis.
b. Mary didn’t think that Sue was defending her thesis.
The two sentences in (24) are grammatical ; however, notice that the sentence
in (24a) is semantically ambiguous, and may be interpreted with wide or
narrow scope with respect to the matrix predicate and negation. Unlike the
complement in (24a), the complement of think in (24b) must be interpreted
with narrow scope, as expected if this complement must be in its base-
generated position within VP at LF in accordance with the hypothesis
presented here.
Going back to the original contrast in (22), repeated here, the
grammaticality of the [+Past]-will sequence in (22b), where the predicates are
factive, suggests that the clausal complement has moved from the VP-internal
position to some higher position where the head of TP is not c-commanded by
the matrix [+Past] at LF.
(22) a. *Mary believed/considered/thought that Sue will defend her thesis
tomorrow.
b. Mary pointed out/forgot/remembered that Sue will defend her thesis
tomorrow.
Once again, this leads us to conclude that the condition forcing the
propositional complement to stay within VP, which accounts for the
ungrammaticality of the non-factive constructions in (22a), is not operative in
the case of factive complements. These are precisely the expected results if
the structural difference between factive and propositional complements
postulated in this paper is on the right track, and factive complements are
outside VP at LF. This claim is also supported by K&K’s observation that
factive complements optionally undergo expletive replacement of IT – what
they call «extraposition» –, but non-factive ones never do 5 :
(25) a. It makes sense to me that there are porcupines in our basement
b. That there are porcupines in our basement makes sense to me.
(26) a. It seems to me that there are porcupines in our basement.
b. *That there are porcupines in our basement seems to me.
In the next section I will analize the possible source of this difference in a
more systematic way.
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4. The Nature of the Propositional/Factive Distinction
4.1. The Factivity of Derived Nominals
Vendler (1967) already observed that derived nominals are ambiguous
between an eventive and a propositional interpretation (see Asher 1993,
Zucchi 1993, Ormazabal 1995 and references there). The event reading of
these constructions is obtained when embedded in contexts where the matrix
predicate requires an event-type complement, as in (27), while the
propositional interpretation may be seen in cases like (28) :
(27) a. [The collapse of the Germans] was fast/took place in Russia.
b. [Her decision to leave the company] was difficult.
c. We witnessed [the destruction of the building].
(28) a. Mary admitted/mentioned [her decision to leave the company].
b. The general regretted [the collapse of the Germans].
c. We were informed of [the destruction of the building].
It has also been observed in the literature that pure propositional
predicates like claim or believe do not easily combine with nominal
complements : when derived nominals have propositional content, their
distribution is nevertheless restricted to factive contexts, and they can never
be in the complement position of propositional attitude predicates, as the
contrast between the cases in (28), where the predicates are all factive, and the
ungrammatical (29) illustrates.
(29) a. *Mary claims/believes [the collapse of the Germans in Russia].
b. *[Your decision to leave the company] is false.
In a theory where factive and propositional complements are assumed
to have different internal structure 6, a stipulation regarding the semantic
nature of derived nominals as obligatorily factive would suffice to account for
the contrast illustrated here. If derived nominals, unlike that-clauses, are
inherently factive, these complements cannot satisfy the selectional
requirement of propositional attitude predicates ; their combination would
create a conflict between the selectional properties of the predicate, which
requires a (non-factive) propositional complement, and the factive
interpretation of the complement.
If the structural hypothesis I have been defending is correct, however,
the difference between factive and propositional complements cannot be due
to an internal difference, but its syntactic reflex is the structural position these
two complement-types occupy. Consequently, the presuppositional
interpretation associated with proposition-denoting nominals must be related
to their structural position. But notice that this is precisely what we expect
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independently given the nature of the definite DPs, since these phrases must
move out of the VP for independent reasons.
4.2. Case vs. Definiteness : the Structure and Properties
of Factive Complements
4.2.1. A Case-Theoretic Approach to the Syntactic Differences
Given the behavior and syntactic properties of derived nominals just
discussed, it could be argued that the difference between factive and
propositional complements that motivates the different position they end up
occupying at LF is syntactically driven ; the logic of the argument would be
based on some syntactic feature present in factive clauses, as well as in
derived nominals, but missing in propositional complements, which would
motivate the movement up in the former but not in the latter. An obvious
possibility that comes to mind is to assume K&K’s original idea that factive
complements have a more complex structure, with a nominal-like projection
over CP. Interpreted in terms more in accordance with current theoretical
assumptions, the internal structure K&K’s hypothesis attributes to factive and
propositional complements would then be as in (30a) and (30b) respectively :
(30) a. Factive predicates b. Propositional predicates
DP
D CP CP
C’ C’
C TP C TP
Given that structural difference, one could appeal to a Case-theoretic
difference to derive the different structural position the two complement types
occupy at LF from their internal structure, given that the DP/CP distinction
with regard to Case-features seems to be a quite steady one ; thus several facts
suggest that clauses, unlike nominal phrases, do not check Case with the
verbal head 7.
If this conclusion is correct, an internal difference along the lines of
K&K’s hypothesis would account for the different position these two
complement types occupy at LF : factive complements, being DPs, would
have to move to check their Accusative Case features with the verb, while
propositional complements would stay in situ. A head-incorporation
mechanism, which seems to be associated with – at least some – propositional
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contexts could be the alternative way to satisfy the Visibility Condition in the
case of arguments other than DPs 8.
However, some properties of factive complements suggest against
postulating a higher DP-type projection over CP. Consider, for instance, their
properties with regard to expletive-elements ; when factive complements form
part of expletive-argument chains, the expletive they associate with must be
IT, the same expletive associated with clausal complements, and they can
never form part of a chain with expletive THERE :
(31) a. They never mentioned it to the candidates [that the job was poorly paid].
b. Don’t spread it around [that I am giving you this assignment].
[Postal & Pullum 1988, eexx. (22a, g)]
(32) a. *They never mentioned there to the candidates [that the job was poorly
paid]
b. *Don’t spread there around [that I am giving you this assignment].
Although the question of how the distribution of it/there expletives may be
derived has not been successfully answered 9, the right descriptive
generalization seems to involve a CP/DP partition in the generality of the
cases, which would have to be abandoned if factive complements are not CPs
but DPs.
Moreover, there are strong theory-internal reasons to reject a higher
projection over CP. Notice that if a DP-projection is postulated over CP, that
projection must be headed by a null determiner ; but, according to what I have
been arguing, this head would have to incorporate in order to satisfy the
morphological filter on stranded affixes. However, I have extensively argued
that it is precisely the impossibility of incorporation that accounts for the
distribution of zero-headed propositional clauses with factive verbs and, in
particular, for the impossibility of ECM and that-less clauses in these
contexts. Of course, the general proposal could be weakened in some way so
that two types of zero-affixes are distinguished, but this move would cast
serious doubts on the entire approach and does not seem motivated by any
reason other than the factive structure itself.
4.2.2. A «Definiteness» Approach to the Syntactic Differences
The factive/pure propositional distinction seems to be of a
fundamental semantic nature, given their distribution and properties ; this is
supported by the fact that the set of predicates that select factive complements
and the group of those that select pure propositional ones constitute closed
groups, as already observed by K&K 10. The fact that non-factive predicates
do not allow their complements to be presupposed strongly indicates that
factivity is part of the selectional properties of the predicates, and does not
derive from purely syntactic considerations.
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The same conclusion is also supported by the incompatibility of
propositional predicates and complements introduced by inherently factive
expressions such as the fact that, even in cases where the propositional
predicate checks Accusative Case [see K&K], or with any complement that
cannot be non-factive, such as gerundival constructions.
(33) a. *John thought/believed [the fact that the earth is round].
b. *John thought/believed [Mary going to the movies].
Finally, Elliot (1974) and Grimshaw (1977) observe that only factive
predicates allow exclamations.
(34) a. Bill knows how I suffered.
b. I found out what a rat he was. [Grimshaw 1977, ch. 3, ex. 53]
(35) a. *Bill assumed how I suffered.
b. *I expected what a rat he was [Ibid., ex. (54)]
Given the different syntactic structure of exclamative complements, as
compared to regular propositional CPs, this distribution strongly suggest that
we are dealing with a property related to semantic selection.
Melvold (1989), extending a suggestion in previous works in the
literature 11, characterizes the difference between factive and non-factive
contexts as a difference in the definiteness of the complements. This
possibility, more consistent with the general view of this paper than the Case-
theoretic approach sketched above, would take advantage of the fact that
factive complements share with DPs the property of being definite
expressions, and associate this property to some syntactic feature of the
construction. In the line of recent work on the syntax of scope of definite DPs
and quantified expressions 12, we could then assume that definite expressions,
independently of whether they belong to the category C or D, must move to
the specifier of a specific projection, which – following Beghelli & Stowell
(1995) – could be called Ref(erence) P, where they take scope. If, as these
authors argue, quantified expressions are selective with respect to the position
they occupy at LF and if that position determines their scopal properties, the
internal property that will determine what that particular position should be
for each quantified expression must be of a syntactic nature. However, this
syntactic property is clearly associated with a semantic property of the
complement and, at least in some cases, required by the selectional properties
of the matrix predicate.
5. Conclusions
In combination, all the phenomena discussed through this paper
present a picture where the position purely propositional complements occupy
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at LF is necessarily different from the position of factive complements : the
impossibility of null complementizers with factive predicates – whether in
ECM or that-less clauses – and the islandhood effects show that the sentential
complement is forced to move from the complement position inside VP,
making the incorporation of the Ø-affix impossible. On the other hand, tense
dependencies of the type discussed in section 3 and Keyser-type phenomena
in 2.4 support the need for a complementary requirement that forces non-
factive complements to be within VP at that level.
In fact, this requirement forces the propositional complement to be
interpreted within VP even when independent conditions have moved it to a
higher position. For instance, when a purely propositional clause undergoes
passive (A)-movement to a position outside VP, ‘reconstruction’ is forced to
satisfy the LF-requirement for the propositional complement to be in VP, and
the tense dependencies reappear.
In conclusion, this systematic distinction between factive and non-
factive complements is what we expect from the point of view of the
hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this talk. That/ØComp clauses are
assumed to have the same internal structure when they denote a fact or a
proposition and, in particular, the semantic import of the complementizers is
assumed to be the same in both cases. It is thus the position of the complement
that will ultimately determine how the sentence is interpreted, thus whether
the entire sentential complement is presupposed or not.
NOTES
1. The present paper has its origins in chapter 4 of my dissertation (Ormazabal
1995) and is part of the material I presented at the Sentence Architecture-CP: the fine
structure of the domain and the relation CP-IP, held at the EHESS, Paris, Décembre
13th, 2002. I am grateful to the organizers of the workshop, especially to Hans
Obenauer, for the opportunity they gave me to present this material, and to the
Research Group Typologie et universaux linguistiques of the CNRS. I am particularly
grateful to Rikardo Etxepare, Fernando García Murga and Myriam Uribe-Etxebarria
for their helpful comments. This research was supported in part by the Basque
Government grant number PI-1998-127, the Spanish Government grant number
BFF2002-04238-C02-01, and the University of the Basque Country grant number
9/UPV 0033.130-138888/2001 to the Basque Center for Language Research (LEHIA).
2. For some recent examples see Asher & Lascarides (1998), Beaver (2001) and
Kratzer (2002).
3. See Pesetsky (1992) and Ormazabal (1995) for discussion, and Bo‡kovi÷ &
Lasnik (2003) for a recent analysis of null complementizer incorporation recasting
Pesetsky’s proposal in different terms.
4. There is one respect in which the statement in the text is not entirely accurate.
In addition to their morphological differences, there is a second potential source for
other distinctions, since that and the null complementizer might differ with regard to
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the type of complement they select. Consider, for instance, the fact that there are no
ECM-infinitives in English introduced by the overt complementizer that, an option
that would be logically possible in the system developed here. Although it is not clear
to me why this is not possible, the fact that the null complementizer and that differ in
this respect is perfectly compatible with the general hypothesis in this paper, because
infinitival and [+Tense] Tenses are not semantically equivalent, thus they may be
selected by different heads.
5. There is an additional difference between these two predicate types that
mirrors the ones in the text – Uribe-Etxebarria (1994 : ch. 3, fn 22) attributes this
observation to Mamoru Saito (personal communication)-. This difference is related to
the different degree of acceptability that results from topicalizing the complement of
factive and propositional predicates, as the contrast in (ia-b) shows :
(i) a. That Mary was smart, I didn’t say
b. ??That Mary was smart, I didn’t think
6. See references in Ormazabal (1995, ch. 1) for discussion.
7. Notice that the DP/CP distinction with regard to Case-checking properties
would reintroduce the old PF Case filter in the theory, although in somehow different
terms. The descriptive generalization then, intended to derive from Visibility, would be
as follows : «CASE FILTER : Argument NPs/DPs must check Case».
8. See Baker (1988), Uriagereka (1988, 1994), Koopman (1994) and references
cited there.
9. See McCloskey (1991), Den Dikken (1993), Lasnik (1995), Groat (1999) and
references cited there for discussion.
10. Of course, this does not preclude lexically ambiguous predicates, as discussed
above.
11. See K&K, Karttunen (1973, 1974), among others.
12. See, among others, Beghelli (1995), Beghelli & Stowell (1995), and references
cited there.
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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article analyse l’observation de Kiparsky et Kiparsky (1970), selon
laquelle il existe une corrélation profonde entre la syntaxe et la sémantique des
compléments factifs à la lumière d’un large ensemble de phénomènes déjà
connus et nouveaux : l’incompatibilité des compléments à marquage de cas
exceptionnel et sans complémenteur that avec les prédicats factifs, les effets
d’îlots faibles, l’incompatibilité des compléments purement propositionnels
avec les verbes contenant des préfixes aspectuels (RE-, DIS-), les restrictions
sur la concordance des temps dans les contextes propositionnels. Je propose
qu’il existe une différence structurale entre compléments propositionnels et
factifs relative à la position syntaxique qu’ils occupent, différence qui rend
compte des phénomènes syntaxiques discutés ici, et qui fournit en même
temps une base solide pour l’expression de la différence sémantique –
présence vs absence d’une présupposition – entre les types de compléments :
les compléments factifs apparaissent, en FL, à l’extérieur de VP, tandis que les
compléments propositionnels doivent occuper leur position «de base» à
l’intérieur de VP.
MOTS-CLÉS
Factive, précupposition, proposition, sélection du complémenteur, complé-
menteur zéro, affixation d’éléments zéro, interface syntaxe-sémantique,
interactions entre temps et prédicats, concordance des temps.
